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One of the best kept secrets in American labor law is that duty of fair representa-
tion jurisprudence simply does not work. It does not work for plaintiff union
members because they must satisfy a close-to-impossible burden of proof and have a
short statute of limitations window in which to assert their claim. It does not work
for defendant unions because they are often forced to file pointless grievances in
order to avoid the cost of litigation. It does not work for defendant employers be-
cause they are often brought into these lawsuits because they have the "deep
pockets."
This Article makes two proposals to reform duty of fair representation jurispru-
dence. First, this Article posits that putative plaintiffs should be required to have
their claims adjudicated before internal union review tribunals as opposed to
courts. This internal tribunal system, if procedurally and substantively fair,
would provide unions with a complete defense to duty offair representation claims.
This would move most duty of fair representation disputes from the ex-post stage
(after a court dispute has arisen) to the ex-ante stage (before a court dispute has
arisen) and reduce unnecessary litigation. Second, this Article argues that the cur-
rent system needs to be "tweaked" to return to the original Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967), intent of utilizing re-arbitration as a remedy, as distinguished from
money damages, when a breach of the duty offair representation is found.
'Justice requires a fair tribunal, but not necessarily an 'optimal' one."
Justice Stephen Breyer
(Before his elevation to the U.S. Supreme Court)
Stanton v. Delta Airlines, 669 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1982)
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"[A]n order compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the
available remedies when a breach of the union's duty is proved."
Justice Byron White
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967)
I. INTRODUCTION
A labor union's duty of fair representation is a staple part of la-
bor law jurisprudence.' The duty has been well defined by a series
of United States Supreme Court decisions.2 Academic commentary
has also been voluminous.3 One of the best kept secrets in Ameri-
can labor law, however, is that duty of fair representation
jurisprudence simply does not work. It does not work for plaintiff
union members because they must satisfy a nearly impossible bur-
den of proof4 and have a very short statute of limitations window to
assert their claim. It does not work for defendant unions because
they are often forced to file pointless grievances in order to avoid
1. The duty of fair representation has been taught for generations in law schools
throughout the country. For extended discussion, see ARCHIBALD Cox, DERRICK CURTIS
BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1107-
59 (14th ed. 2006); MICHAEL C. HARPER, SAMUEL ESTREICHER &JOAN FLYNN, LABOR LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1019-63 (6th ed. 2007); THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE,
CHARLES B. CRAVER & MARION G. CRAIN, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
822-53 (11 th ed. 2005). Additionally, the duty of fair representation is extensively discussed
in the major treatises on labor law. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1987-2095 (ch. 25)
(John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006); ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATrHEW W. FINKIN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 981-1018 (ch. 30)
(2d ed. 2004); LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION 277-420 (ch. 4) (William W. Osborne,
Jr. et al. eds., 2003).
2. See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33 (1996); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991); United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990); Teamsters
Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S.
67 (1989); DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); Bowen v. United
States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42
(1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192 (1944).
3. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1988 n.4 (citing numerous authori-
ties). Interestingly, there has not been much recent scholarly commentary.
4. In order to prevail in a cause of action alleging a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation, the putative plaintiff has a high wall to climb in that the mere failure to bring a
meritorious grievance to arbitration does not establish a cause of action for the breach of a
union's duty of fair representation. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191; Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. 65. For
discussion of the applicable standard, see infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing heightened standard).
5. The statute of limitations to bring a duty of fair representation claim is six months.
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169; Harris v. Kaydon Corp., No. 1:07-CV-514, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
259, at *7-8 (W.D. Mich.Jan. 2, 2008).
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the cost of litigation. It does not work for defendant employers
because they are often brought into these lawsuits simply because
they have the "deep pockets."7 Additionally, under the current sys-
tem, it is very easy for a putative plaintiff to assert his or her claim.
However, plaintiffs rarely prevail. From a public policy standpoint,
none of this makes much sense.8
In order to "fix" this system, this Article posits two proposals.
First, it is submitted that duty of fair representation claims should
be adjudicated in internal union review tribunals as opposed to
courts. The internal union tribunal system, if procedurally and
substantively fair, would provide unions with a complete defense to
duty of fair representation claims. This would move most duty of
fair representation disputes from the ex-post stage (after a court
dispute has arisen) to the ex-ante stage (before a court dispute has
arisen) .9
Additionally, this Article asserts that the current system needs
to be "tweaked" to return to the original intent of Vaca v. Sipes,'0
to utilize re-arbitration" as a remedy in duty of fair representation
cases. Remarkably, though Vaca expressly stated that "arbitration
should be viewed as one of the available remedies
when a breach of the union's duty is proved,"'" this aspect of the
decision has been virtually ignored by commentators 3 and the
6. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing unions' fear of duty of fair
representation litigation).
7. An aggrieved employee can sue his employer for breach of contract, his union for
breach of the duty of fair representation, or both in a hybrid action commonly referred to as
a suit for breach of the duty of fair representation. See DelCosteo, 462 U.S. at 163-66 (dis-
cussing nature of cause of action).
8. An employee who feels that he has been treated unfairly by his union can file a
charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") or he can sue his union, his em-
ployer or both in federal or state court under 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Journeyman Pipe
Fitters Local 392 v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 225, 226 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Tand v. Solomon
Schechter Day Sch., 324 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (permitting state court duty of fair
representation action to be removed to federal court).
9. See infra Part IV.A (discussing internal union tribunals in the context of duty of fair
representation disputes).
10. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Vaca is unquestionably the leading case in duty of fair repre-
sentation jurisprudence.
11. Throughout this Article, the term "re-arbitration" is used in connection with duty
of fair representation remedies where an unfairly represented employee would be entitled
to present his or her case to a second arbitrator because the union breached its duty of fair
representation in connection with the first arbitration. This term is also used to generically
refer to arbitration as a remedy when a union unfairly refuses to arbitrate an employee's
grievance in the first instance in violation of its duty of fair representation, thereby resulting
in a need to arbitrate the dispute.
12. 386 U.S. at 196.
13. District of Columbia Senior Circuit Judge Harry T Edwards, a former labor law
professor and labor arbitrator, Professor Samuel Estreicher, Professor Martin H. Malin, and
a handful of others, have recognized that routinely awarding unfairly represented
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courts4 who routinely seek to fashion a monetary damage remedy
in order put the injured plaintiff in the position he or she would
have been had the union not breached its duty of fair representa-
tion.
employees monetary damages is not consistent with the principles underlying Vaca. See
HARPER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 1050 (questioning whether unfairly represented employee
should have a remedy (private damages) that a fairly represented employee does not enjoy);
Stuart Bernstein, Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation: The Appropriate Remedy, 33 NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. PROC. 88 (1980); Harry T. Edwards, The Duty of Fair Representation: A View From
The Bench, in THE CHANGING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 93 (Jean T McKelvey ed., 1985);
Samuel Estreicher, Essay, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities
For Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 827 (1996) [hereinafter Estreicher, Freedom of
Contract); Samuel Estreicher, Win-Win LaborLaw Reform, 10 LAB. LAW. 667, 675 (1994) [here-
inafter Estreicher, Win-Win Labor Law Reform]; Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the
Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 127, 182 n.240 (1992).
Indeed, most of the leading scholarly commentary concerning union liability for breach
of the duty of fair representation does not even discuss re-arbitration as a potential remedy,
but rather presumes the norm of monetary damages as a remedy. See DanielJ. Bussel, Liabil-
ity For Concurrent Breach of Contract, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 97 (1995); David L. Gregory, Union
Liability for Damages After Bowen v. Postal Service: The Incongruity Between Labor Law and Title
VII Jurisprudence, 35 BAYLOR L. Rv. 237 (1983); Steven L. Murray, Apportionment of Damages
in Section 301 Duty of Fair Representation Actions: The Impact of Bowen v. Postal Service, 32
DEPAUL L. REv. 743 (1983); Comment, Union Liability in Fair Representation Suits, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 278 (1983);JeraldJ. Director, Annotation, Union's Liability in Damages for Refusal orFail-
ure to Process Employee Grievance, 34 A.L.R. 3D 884 (2005); see also Michael C. Harper & Ira C.
Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1211 (1985) (criticizing duty of
fair representation jurisprudence, but making no mention of the failure of courts to order
re-arbitration as a remedy where a breach of the duty of fair representation is found).
14. In hybrid actions alleging the employer's breach of contract (the collective bar-
gaining agreement) and the union's breach of the duty of fair representation, re-arbitration
is often not even considered by courts as a remedy. Rather, such causes of action are rou-
tinely treated as actions for monetary damages. See, e.g., Burger v. Int'l Union of Elevator
Constructors Local 2, 498 E3d 750 (7th Cir. 2007); Beck v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 99, 506 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007); Ramey v. Dist. 141, Int'l Ass'n of Ma-
chinists, 378 E3d 269 (2d Cir. 2004); LaPerriere v. UAW, 348 E3d 127 (6th Cir. 2003); Vencl
v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 137 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 1998); Lampkin v. UAW,
154 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1998); Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir.
1998); Wilson v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 83 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 1996); Sparks v. UAW, 99 E3d
1140 (6th Cir. 1996); Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 58 F.3d 513 (10th
Cir. 1995); Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986); Ruzicka v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 649 E2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981); Musto v. Transp. Workers Union, 339 F. Supp. 2d 456
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Higdon v. Entenmann's Sales Co., 170 L.R.R.M 3234 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Vat-
tiat v. U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 214 E Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Or. 2001); Commodari v. Long
Island Univ., 89 E Supp. 2d 353 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 62 Fed. App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2003); ac-
cord Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Reg'l Import & Export Trucking Co., 944 F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("Vaca teaches that the employees would have the option to bypass the arbitration
procedure and look to the court to enforce their contractual rights, were they to so
choose."); see also Comment, Employee Challenges to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Protecting Indi-
vidual Rights Under the Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1310, 1324 (1977) (noting
that "[w]hen an individual has succeeded in proving that he was inadequately represented
by the union, courts following Vaca have generally adjudicated the merits of the underlying
grievance rather than ordering the dispute to arbitration"); LABOR UNION LAW AND REGU-
LATION, supra note 1, at 396 ("[Clourts have rarely directed the employer and union to
arbitrate a grievance.").
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The current practice of most courts in plenary actions-to sim-
ply award monetary damages when the duty of fair representation
is breached-does not serve the public interest. Instead, it effec-
tively feeds unions' fear of lawsuits by encouraging them to bring
useless grievances in order to avoid the potential of a costly lawsuit.
Litigation is particularly undesired by unions as well as by employ-
ers who, in the course of defending such lawsuits, are placed into a
quasi-type of co-counsel arrangement to respond to the union
member plaintiffs allegations.' 5
Although a breach of the duty of fair representation can occur
in a variety of different factual situations, this Article focuses on the
most common form-where the union refuses to take a grievance
to arbitration or handles arbitration in a perfunctory manner. This
Article primarily addresses court litigation and not duty of fair rep-
resentation claims before the National Labor Relations Board.'6
Part Two of this Article explores the development of the duty of
fair representation and provides a synoptic review of current law.
Part Three demonstrates the flawed nature of duty of fair represen-
tation jurisprudence. Part Four asserts that the adjudication of duty
of fair representation claims needs to be moved from the ex-post
stage to the ex-ante stage though the adjudication of such disputes
in internal union review tribunals. Part Five then explains that re-
arbitration should become a presumptive remedy in duty of fair
representation cases. Finally, this Article concludes by summarizing
the need for jurisprudential reform in duty of fair representation
litigation and how this Article's modest proposals are consistent
with existing labor policy.
15. In duty of fair representation cases, employer and union counsel may find them-
selves cooperating with one another in order to avoid any misunderstandings and to assert a
uniform reading of the collective bargaining agreement. Ironically, on the surface this fos-
ters the notion that the union is somehow "in bed" with the employer and not appropriately
serving the employees' interests.
16. Duty of fair representation plenary actions can be filed directly in court pursuant
to Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
The filing of unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB alleging a breach of the duty of
fair representation does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to a hybrid plenary
action filed in court. Arriaga-Zayas v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 835 F.2d 11, 14
(1st Cir. 1987); Conley v. Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 639, 810 F.2d 913, 916 (9th
Cir. 1987); Cortes v. Airport Catering Servs. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.PR. 2005); see
also infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing duty of fair representation cases
filed with the NLRB as unfair labor practices).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
At common law, there was no duty of fair representation doc-
trine." Neither the Railway Labor Act" nor the National Labor
Relations Act,'9 the two major labor relations statutes in this coun-
try, have an express provision requiring "fair representation."2 °
However, under both of these statutes, unions act as the exclusive
representative of their members for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. 2' That principle of exclusivity led to the recognition of the
duty of fair representation.22
Today, this principle of exclusivity is what often leads to duty of
fair representation litigation.23 Union members generally do not
have the right, without the support of their union, to bring their
grievances to arbitration or even appeal an adverse arbitration de-
cision. Stated another way, individuals generally do not have
17. Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 563 (1990).
18. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). The Railway Labor Act of 1926, as amended, is one
of the first federal statutes that recognized the obligation of certain private employers, called
carriers in the railroad and airline industry, and their unions to collectively bargain. See
Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Pan American Airways Corp., 405 F.3d 25, 33 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing scope of Railway Labor Act).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as
amended, regulates labor-management relations in most of the private-sector workforce.
Among the important provisions of this statute, it created the National Labor Relations
Board which recognized in 1962 that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 1, at 27-30 (discussing
role of NLRB under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
20. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW supra note 1, at 1988. It should be noted that under
several state law public sector labor statutes, a breach of the duty of fair representation is
considered to be an improper practice which is the equivalent of an unfair labor practice in
the private sector. See, e.g., Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Union Immunity From Suit in New York, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 641, 671 n.118 (2006) (stating that New York law was amended to ex-
pressly make a breach of the duty of fair representation an improper practice).
21. Under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 and Sec-
tion 2, ninth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, unions are the exclusive
representative of certified labor organizations. Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 99, 506 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Is a Full Labor Relations Evidentiary Privilege Develop-
ing, 29 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 221, 237 (2008) ("Under the NLRA and analogous state
public sector labor relations statutes, unions are the exclusive representatives of employ-
ees.").
22. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the principle of exclusive representation
'underlies the National Labor Relations Act as well as the Railway Labor Act [and] is a cen-
tral element in the congressional structuring of industrial relations." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220 (1977) (footnote omitted).
23. I have noted that duty of fair representation claims are the primary form of litiga-
tion that unions face. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Assignment of Labor Arbitration, 81 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 41, 50 (2007).
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standing on their own to assert claims under a collective bargain-
ing agreement because the union is their exclusive representative.24
The duty of fair representation has its genesis in this country's
.25history of racial discrimiation. The Supreme Court first recog-
nized the duty in 1944 in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co.,26 a case which arose under the Railway Labor Act of 1926.27 In
Steele, a black employee sought to set aside a collectively bargained
seniority system which overtly discriminated against black workers
who were also union members. The Court found inherent in the
Railway Labor Act a duty of bargaining representatives "to exercise
fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom
it acts, without hostile discrimination against them.,
28
There being no federal agency to enforce rights under the Railway
Labor Act,29 the Court concluded that this type of claim could be en-
forced in federal court by damages as well as by awarding appropriate
24. I have also previously analyzed the lack of an individual right to pursue claims un-
der a collective bargaining agreement and the issue of union member standing to assert a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 50-57.
25. Clyde Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977) (discussing history of duty of
fair representation); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1989 (discussing origins
of duty of fair representation).
26. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
27. 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (2000).
28. 323 U.S. at 203. That inherent power existed because the union was the exclusive
representative of the employees. The Court reasoned:
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-union
members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discriminating against them as such
in the contracts which it makes as their representative, the minority would be left with
no means of protecting their interests.... The fair interpretation of the statutory
language is that the organization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its
members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against
those whom it represents. It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a
granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a
duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power
will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised
unless so expressed.
Id. at 201-02.
In recognizing what became known as the duty of fair representation, the Court also drew
upon a constitutional law analogy. Specifically, the court reasoned that unions have "at least
as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the [unit] as the Consti-
tution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom
it legislates." Id. at 202; see also Harper & Lupu, supra note 13 (discussing development of the
duty of fair representation and arguing that equal protection doctrine should provide the
normative underpinnings for the duty of fair representation jurisprudence).
29. To this day, the Railway Labor Act does not contain any unfair labor practices or
any administrative agency to adjudicate violations of law. The National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006), of course, sets forth a series of unfair labor practices which are en-
forced by the NLRB. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 1, at 982.
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injunctive relief3 At the time, the Court's recognition of the duty of
fair representation was very progressive, considering that the decision
preceded by two decades the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, sl which outlawed employment discrimination and, in
particular, discrimination on account of race.2
About a decade later, in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, the Supreme
Court extended the duty of fair representation to private sector
employers subject to the National Labor Relations Act.3 3 In so do-
ing, the Court recognized that unions have the right to make
reasonable distinctions among employees that were "within rea-
sonable bounds of relevancy"34 and that unions must be afforded a
"wide range of reasonableness ... subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Vaca v. Sipes, the most
important case involving the duty of fair representation, and fur-
ther clarified the nature of the duty. In Vaca, the Court recognized
a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation be-
cause, like the Railway Labor Act, the National Labor Relations Act
affords unions exclusive power to represent employees: Vaca
30. Specifically, the Court stated that when a violation occurred, an injured employee
may "resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction and award damages when appropri-
ate." 323 U.S. at 207.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Interestingly, today, in order to prove that a union vio-
lated Title VII in its role as a representative of employees, a plaintiff must establish: 1) that
the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement; 2) that the union breached its
duty of fair representation by allowing that breach to go unrepaired; and 3) that the union
member was treated less favorably on account of race or any other impermissible factor.
Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99, 506 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007); Bugg v.
Int'l Union of Allied Indus. Workers Local 507, 674 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1982). A discussion of
union liability under Title VII is beyond the scope of this Article.
32. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 1 at 1022 (stating that Steele, 323 U.S. 192, was a
landmark decision in the struggle against racial discrimination).
33. 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953). Interestingly, this 1953 case did not concern dis-
crimination on account of race or some other prohibited classification. Rather, certain
employees complained that the seniority system was discriminatory because it gave seniority
credit for military service. Id. at 334-35.
34. Id. at 342.
35. Id. at 338.
36. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
37. See id. at 186. The holding that the duty of fair representation stems from a union's
authorization to represent employees exclusively under Section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 159(a) (2006), is an important concept because not all private
employers are subject to the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act. For
example, under Section 14(c) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has discre-
tion to decline jurisdiction where the effect on commerce is not substantial. 29 U.S.C. §
164(c)(1) (2006). In those industries, there is some authority for the proposition that a
union would not owe its employees any duty of fair representation under federal law. See,
e.g., Eatz v. DME Unit of Local Union No. 3, 973 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the
union of mutuel clerks in horseracing industry does not owe its members any duty of fair
representation under federal law since NLRB has declined to exercise its jurisdiction in the
[VOL. 42:3
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established that unions breach their duty of fair representation
when their conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.38
That tripartite standard has been repeatedly endorsed by later Su-
preme Court decisions.3 9 The Vaca Court also implied, but declined
to hold, that a breach of the duty of fair representation constituted
an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act.
4
0
The Court also declined to assume that the NLRB's tardy assump-
tion of jurisdiction4 1 indicated that Congress intended to oustcours ofther ..... 42
courts of their traditional jurisdiction. This allowed an employee
to bring his or her claim before the NLRB or before a court.43 Vaca
horseracing and dogracing industries through its rulemaking authority set forth in 29 C.F.R.
§103.3).
38. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
39. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Marquez v. Screen
Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1996).
The Vaca tripartite standard of fair representation has also been adopted under many
state public sector labor laws. See, e.g., Logan v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 878
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (California law); Hoff v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 758 P.2d 674
(Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (Colorado law); Stanley v. Am. Fed'n of State & Mun. Employees Lo-
cal 553, 884 A.2d 724 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (Maryland law); Weiner v. Beatty, 116 P.3d
829 (Nev. 2005) (Nevada law); Baker v. Bd. of Educ., 514 N.E.2d 1109 (N.Y. 1987) (NewYork
Law); see also Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 673 ("New York has recognized a duty of fair rep-
resentation for public sector unions almost identical to that which has been recognized in
the private sector.").
40. 386 U.S. at 183.
41. It was not until 1962 that the NLRB recognized that a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation was an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A)of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (2006). Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The Vaca tripartite
standard has also been recognized as the governing standard in duty of fair representation
cases under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. Iron Workers Local
Union 377, 326 N.L.R.B. 375, 387 (1998).
42. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 183. The Supreme Court has stated that the duty of fair represen-
tation in the unfair labor practice context resembles hybrid court actions "and indeed there
is a substantial overlap." DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170 (1983); see
also Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1989) (discussing rela-
tionship between duty of fair representation unfair labor practices and plenary actions filed
in court). The Board has also recognized the resemblance, but has indicated that NLRB
proceedings are "not precisely parallel" to court proceedings. Iron Workers, 326 N.L.R.B. at
377 n.15. This is because the employer is not typically a party and the Board does not always
have jurisdiction to decide the breach of contract issue. Id.; cf.Jacoby v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 301,
307-08 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding the court not required to give NLRB precedent any weight
with respect to duty of fair representation claims initiated by a lawsuit).
43. At first blush, it may seem that permitting employees to file an unfair representa-
tion claim in court without at least first having to proceed before the Board is out of step
with the movement in this country towards alternative forms of dispute resolution and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. However, in other aspects of employment law it is common
for putative plaintiffs to have multiple forums to choose from. For example, a plaintiff alleg-
ing racial discrimination can first proceed under Title VII administratively or he or she
could choose to litigate that same issue under state law via an administrative agency or, in
some cases, directly in state court. See Samuel Estreicher & Michael Harper, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 1052 (3d ed. 2008).
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also held that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
in duty of fair representation cases.4
Under Vaca, an individual employee does not have a right to pre-
sent even a meritorious grievance to a labor arbitrator.
Nonetheless, recognizing the wide latitude that unions have to en-
force their collective bargaining agreements, the Court held that
unions could not simply ignore meritorious grievances.45 Vaca also
indicated that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative contrac-
tual remedies before proceeding with a claim in court that the
union breached its duty of fair representation.46
Very significantly, Vaca also addressed remedies for a breach of
the duty of fair representation. Specifically, the Court held:
The appropriate remedy for a breach of a union's duty of fair
representation must vary with the circumstances of the par-
ticular breach.
Petitioners urge that an employee be restricted in such cir-
cumstances to a decree compelling the employer and the
union to arbitrate the underlying grievance. It is true that the
employee's action is based on the employer's alleged breach
of contract plus the union's alleged wrongful failure to afford
him his contractual remedy of arbitration. For this reason, an
order compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the available
remedies when a breach of duty is proved. But we see no reason in-
flexibly to require arbitration in all cases. In some cases, for
example, at least part of the employee's damages may be at-
tributable to the union's breach of duty, and an arbitrator may
have no power under the bargaining agreement to award
such damages against the union. In other cases, the arbitrable
issues may be substantially resolved in the course of trying the
fair representation controversy. In such situations, the court
should be free to decide the contractual claim and to award
the employee appropriate damages or equitable relief.
47
44. 386 U.S. at 178-83. For early academic commentary on the ability of plaintiffs to
proceed in federal or state court, see Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L.
REv. 151 (1957).
45. Vaca, 386 U.S at 190-91.
46. Id. at 185.
47. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 195-96 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The remedies that
the NLRB may award when it finds that a union committed an unfair labor practice by
breaching its duty of fair representation are a bit different than court awards in plenary
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The Supreme Court later held that a plaintiff could sue its em-
ployer for breach of contract, its union for breach of the duty of
fair representation, or both;" that a plaintiff in such a suit has the
right to a trial by jury;49 that damages must be apportioned accord-
ing to the degree of fault;50 that punitive damages are not
available;5 1 that the applicable statute of limitations is six months;5
2
that the NLRB did not have primary jurisdiction over duty of fair
representation claims; 53 that the Vaca tripartite standard applies to
all union activity;54 that a union's mere negligence would not estab-
lish a breach of the duty;55 and that a breach of the duty of fair
representation would remove finality from any prior arbitration
determination.5
In 1983, in DelCostello v. Teamsters, the Supreme Court further
commented on the nature of duty of fair representation actions. Spe-
cifically, the Court stated that the employer's breach of the collective
bargaining agreement and the union's breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation were two separate claims which were "inextricably
hybrid actions. In cases where a union has unfairly refused to pursue a grievance or an arbi-
tration, the Board issues a remedial order which mandates that the union request that the
employer promptly consider the grievance, and if it agrees to do so, to process it and permit
the unfairly represented employee to be represented by a private attorney, at the union's
expense, in the grievance and/or arbitration hearing. In the event that it is not possible to
pursue a grievance or arbitration and if the General Counsel is able to show that a timely
pursed grievance would have been successful, then the union is responsible for any increases
in damages suffered as a consequence of its refusal to process a grievance. Iron Workers, 326
N.L.R.B 375; Branch 3126, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 330 N.L.R.B. 587 (2000), enforced,
281 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Warehouse Union Local 6, 336 N.L.R.B. 104 (2001).
Thus, the union is only responsible for its share of the damages. The unfairly represented
member would have to sue the employer in court to obtain damages from the employer. See
Iron Workers, 326 N.L.R.B at 379. This raises a whole host of issues concerning NLRB reme-
dies in duty of fair representation cases which are left for another day.
48. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). As a practical mat-
ter, in hybrid duty of fair representation lawsuits, plaintiffs sue employers and unions
simultaneously. Although an employee may have a claim against the union because of the
way a grievance was handled, it is the employer who took the action against the employee in
the first place. Additionally, if reinstatement is sought, unions obviously cannot award this
remedy. See Comment, Employee Challenges To Arbitral Awards, supra note 14, at 1312-13 n.10;
accordBreininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 69, 80 (1989) ("In Vaca, we identi-
fied an 'intensely practical consideratio[n]' of having the same entity adjudicate a joint
claim against both the employer and the union... .") (citation omitted).
49. Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 561 (1990).
50. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 218 (1983) (citing Vaca, 386 U.S.
at 197-98).
51. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1979).
52. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169.
53. Breininger, 493 U.S. at 83-84.
54. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991).
55. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990).
56. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 555 (1976).
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interdependent. , 7 The plaintiff employee files what is commonly
referred to as a hybrid claim for breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation and breach of contract claim against the employer, the
union, or both. 5s To prevail, however, a plaintiff must establish both
a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union and a
breach of contract by the employer.59
In order to determine if a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion occurred, each part of the Vaca tripartite standard-breach
requires that union action be arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith-must be analyzed separately. Under Vaca, a union's actions
are considered arbitrary if they are so far outside a wide range of
reasonableness as to be considered irrational.6 A union's actions
are deemed arbitrary if they fail to take a basic and required step
under the collective bargaining agreement.6 Union action, or lack
thereof, may also be "arbitrary" if it results in an "egregious disre-
gard for the rights of union members.",3 The wide range of
discretion conferred upon unions allows them to make discretion-
ary decisions and choices even if those judgments are ultimately
64
wrong.
A showing of bad faith requires establishing fraudulent, deceit-
ful or dishonest action. 65 Thus, if a union representative acts in his
57. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983).
58. Id. at 165. A plaintiff's failure to name both the union and the employer as parties
may affect his remedy. The employer is not an indispensable party under FED. R. CIv. P. 19,
but may be joined into the lawsuit under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. LABOR UN-
ION LAW AND REGULATION supra note 1, at 390. An analysis of this important issue is beyond
the scope of this Article.
59. See Aldred v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 247 Fed. App'x 167, 171 (11th Cir. 2007); Mitchell v.
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 481 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting McNair v. United States
Postal Se-v., 768 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1985)); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165; cf Soremekun v.
Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff employee bears
the burden of proving both a breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of con-
tract).
60. LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION 139 n.1 (William W. Osborne, Jr. ed., 2007
Cumulative Supp.) (collecting cases).
61. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65,67 (1991); Hinkley v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 249 Fed. App'x. 13, 16 (10th Cir. 2007). Indeed, under this standard, all a union needs
is a reasonable explanation for its actions. Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Un-
ion Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007).
62. Vencl v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 137 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir.
1998); Ruzicka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207,1209 (6th Cir. 1981).
63. Peters v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 931 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Teno-
rio v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1982)) (collecting cases). Intentional
misrepresentation by union officials is considered arbitrary conduct. See Ollman v. Special
Bd. of Adjustment No. 1063, 527 F.3d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that union misrepre-
sentation before arbitration board is arbitrary conduct).
64. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1998).
65. Beck, 506 F.3d at 880; Hinkley, 249 Fed. App'x. at 17; Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co.,
971 F.2d 522, 531 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Thompson v. Aluminum Co., 276 F.3d 651, 658
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own interest, rather than that of the union member, it is consid-
ered bad faith.6' To establish discrimination, a plaintiff must show
animus on behalf of the union and that the plaintiff was treated
67differently than others.
Under the Vaca standard, courts do not second guess a union's
decision not to pursue arbitration.8 Stated another way, courts will
not substitute their 'judgment for that of the union, even [when]
with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the union could have
made a better call. 6 9 A union's tactical decisions, therefore, are
essentially immune from challenge unless they are "so egregious,
so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and
so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary."70
Quite simply, union representation does not have to be error free."'
Even where a plaintiff manages to meet this burden, a substan-
tial body of case law requires that a plaintiff additionally establish
that the breach "seriously undermined" the grievance process. The
individual in question must also have suffered some type of injury.2
(4th Cir. 2002) (stating that issue of discrimination and bad faith focuses on subjective moti-
vation of union).
66. Ooley v. Schwitzer Div., Household Mfg. Inc., 961 F.2d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1992);
accord Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278,1282 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
Additionally, if a union representative intentionally refuses to present relevant evidence,
that can be evidence of bad faith. Achilli v.JohnJ. Nissen Baking Co., 989 E2d 561, 563 (1st
Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.).
67. See, e.g., Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 156 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir 1998); Thompson,
276 F.3d at 658.
68. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); cf Hinkley, 249 Fed. App'x at 17.
69. Matthews v. Milwaukee Area Local Postal Workers Union, 495 F.3d 438, 441 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting McKelvin v. E.J. Brach Corp., 124 F.3d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 1997)).
70. Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 E2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting NLRB v.
Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 740 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1984)). Stated another way, the
union's authority as the exclusive collective bargaining representative empowers it to act
according to its own reasonable interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. See
Bache v. AT&T, 840 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1988).
71. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985).
72. Bishop v. Hotel & Allied Servs. Union Local 758, No. 04-Civ-10074, 2008 WL
136362, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2008); Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007); Hinkley, 249 Fed. App'x. at 17 (10th Cir. 2007);
Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir. 2003); Webb v. ABF Freight Sys. Inc.,
155 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 1998); VanDerVeer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 25 F.3d 403,
405 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Seventh Circuit succinctly stated:
In order to prevail on this claim, in addition to showing that the union acted arbitrar-
ily, Matthews must also establish that he "was actually harmed by the union's actions"
and that "the outcome of the [grievance] would probably have been different but for
the union's activities."
Matthews, 495 F.3d at 441 (quoting Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 E3d 1171, 1176-77 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
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This level of judicial review of union decisions has been de-
scribed by the Supreme Court as "highly deferential." 73 Indeed, aS 74
union only needs to have a colorable justification for its actions.
Under this standard, it is not enough to show that the union did
not represent an employee as vigorously as it could have.75
The policy reasons underlying this heightened standard 76 are
straightforward. As I have previously recognized, if a union were
required to advocate an individual employee's view under the guise
of fair representation, that would undermine the union's role as
the exclusive representative of the collective majority.77 No large
organization, including unions, could possibly satisfy all of their
members all of the time. Therefore, it is entirely predictable that
unions may sometimes interpret the applicable collective bargain-
73. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 66 (1991); see also Hinkley, 249 Fed.
App'x at 17. Indeed the Seventh Circuit stated that a duty of fair representation plaintiff
"does not get to first base unless the union has abandoned him to the wolves." Pease v. Prod.
Workers Union of Chicago & Vicinity Local 707, 386 F.3d 819, 823 (7th Cir. 2004); see also
Comment, Employee Challenges to Arbitral Awards supra note 14, at 1312 ("An individual gener-
ally faces grave difficulties in attacking an arbitral award when the union has failed to
represent him adequately ... ."); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Union Only Needs to Have Colorable
Justification for its Actions to Defeat a Claim that Union Breached its Duty of Fair Representation,
ADJUNCT LAW PROFESSOR BLOG, http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
2007/08/union-only-need.html (Aug 2, 2007) (on file with the University of MichiganJour-
nal of Law Reform) (noting that courts provide unions with a favorable standard of review of
fair representation cases).
74. Matthews, 495 F.3d at 441 (stating that union only needs to have colorable justifica-
tion for its actions to defeat a claim asserting breach of the duty of fair representation);
McKelvin v. E.J. Brach Corp., 124 F.3d 864, 867-68 (7th Cir. 1997).
75. See, e.g., Hinkley, 249 Fed. App'x at 17; Mock v. TG. & Y. Stores Co., 971 E2d 522,
531 (10th Cir. 1992).
76. Some litigants attempt to avoid facing this heightened standard by characterizing
their allegations as something other than a duty of fair representation claim. However, that
is putting form over substance, which courts, of course, do not allow nor look favorably
upon. Courts are not bound to litigants', usually plaintiff's, characterization of the case. See
Lewis v. UFCW Local 2, 243 Fed App'x 445 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court's refusal
to characterize duty of fair representation case as a tort claim or breach of contract claim);
Smith v. Potter, No. H-06-3278, 2008 WL 154462, at *10 n.29 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2008)
(breach of contract claim treated as duty of fair representation claim); Coleman v. City of
New York, 165 L.R.R.M. 2059, 2062 (E.D.N.Y. I999) (treating laundry list of allegations
against union which included allegations of racial discrimination as a claim for breach of the
duty of fair representation); Carroll v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 99-CV-1362, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19332, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1999) (same); Dolce v. Bayport-Blue Point Un-
ion Free Sch. Dist., 728 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (treating laundry list of
complaints against union as a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation
under New York law); accord Adkins v. Mireles, 526 E3d 531, 540 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that appellants may not prevent state law claims from being preempted by the duty of fair
representation by "artfully pleading" their claims).
77. Rubinstein, supra note 23, at 50 (citing Carrion v. Enterprise Ass'n, Metal Trades
Branch Local Union 638, 227 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Thompson v. Alcoa, 276 F.3d
651, 658 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that union may choose to proceed with grievances which
justifies the time and expense in terms of benefiting the membership at large).
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ing agreement differently from individual employees. When this
occurs, litigation may follow.
Significantly, however, duty of fair representation jurisprudence
is a product of judge-made common law.79 Therefore, this body of
law is subject to change and revision, a subject to which this Article
turns next.
III. THE FLAWED NATURE OF EXISTING DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION JURISPRUDENCE
Notwithstanding the heightened standard of judicial deference
in duty of fair representation cases, unions are often fearful of such
suits.8° That fear sometimes causes unions to file grievances which
they know lack merit because they believe that it is simply easier to
file the grievance than to deal with a potential plaintiff. After all,
the employee is a union member who, in some cases, may have
been supporting the union in other matters for years. Also, while
78. Rubinstein, supra note 23, at 50 (citing Commodari v. Long Island Univ., 89 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 62 Fed. App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2003), where a union
member read faculty tenure and review provisions differently from defendant union). In-
deed, the First Circuit affirmed a lower court's statement that:
[T] here's no duty of fair representation to go to bat for any particular pilot because
that pilot is bellyaching about getting less pay. That's the contract. And the union is
supposed to try and negotiate the best contract it can negotiate. So once the con-
tract's negotiated the fact that this or that person doesn't like the way it works, thinks
that their interests aren't adequately represented, there's no lawsuit. No lawsuit be-
cause that's worked out by the democracy within the union ....
Goulet v. New Penn Motor Express, Inc., 512 F.3d 34, 41 (lst Cir. 2008).
79. Several U.S. Supreme Court cases have stated that the duty of fair representation is
a product of the common law. Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 562 (1990); Brein-
inger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 87 (1989); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 n.8 (1979).
80. There are no empirical studies concerning just how widespread this union fear is.
As a practical matter, such a study may be impossible because researchers cannot quantify
what the subjective term "fear" means. Parties may also be reluctant to admit that they are
fearful of litigation. It has been well recognized, however, in the legal literature, that unions
are fearful of duty of fair representation lawsuits and, as a result, often process unmeritori-
ous grievances. See Note, Union Liability in Fair Representation Suits, 97 HARV. L. REV. 278, 282-
83 (1983) ("Fear of unpredictable jury verdicts caused unions to send some unmeritorious
claims to arbitration ... ."); Lester Asher, Comment, 27 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 31, 35-37
(1974) (stating fear of duty of fair representation claims causes unions to press unmeritori-
ous claims). Other scholars have similarly recognized that the fear of potential back pay
liability may cause unions to arbitrate grievances that they would not otherwise do. See Ma-
lin, supra note 13, at 183; Daniel Roy, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union
Workplace After Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1367 (1999);
Bernard W. Rubenstein, Comment, 32 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 47, 48 (1979).
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arbitration does not come cheap,"' it is considerably less costly than
litigation.
While at first blush, such a practice seems at odds with tradi-
tional notions of modern day litigation and the ever present
possibility of sanctions, that is not the case in labor law. A union
acting in this manner would be consistent-or at least not inconsis-
tent-with Supreme Court dicta which indicates that unions may
process frivolous claims due to their potential "therapeutic value"
in labor relations. Sometimes unions must "fight the good fight"
in order to try to do something to alleviate the problem at issue. It
is no secret to labor relations professionals that unions have inter-
nal political needs. Of course, employers often have political
agendas of their own."'
A union's fear is somewhat understandable given the fact that
the plaintiff in a duty of fair representation suit is entitled to a jury
trial.8 4 Juries may not be familiar with labor management relations
or worse yet, be outright hostile to unions. In a lawsuit, the union
always faces the possibility of being found responsible for a portion
of back pay, future loses, compensatory damages and/or attorneys'
fees. 5 Some courts have also awarded damages for emotional dis-
81. A 2004 survey indicated that per diem fees for arbitrators ranged from $350 to
$2,400 per day. LAuRAJ. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 21 (2d ed. 2005). In addi-
tion to this per diem fee, on average each case decided by an arbitrator involves two days of
study time for each day of hearing where arbitrators review the record, undertake research
and draft a written arbitration opinion and award. Id.; see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Advi-
sory Arbitration Under New York Law: Does It Have a Place in Employment Law? 79 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 419, 436 n.83 (2005) (discussing costs of arbitration). Indeed, I regularly appear before
arbitrators who charge $1,800 per day plus expenses and appear before some who charge
considerably more. A full arbitrator's day is considered to be five hours of work-sometimes
less. Unions and employers typically split these fees.
82. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (Douglas, J.)
("The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who
are not part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.").
Even fighting a losing war can have some benefit in labor relations. The fact that an em-
ployer knows that it will have a "fight" on its hands may cause it to stop and think before
taking a similar type of action in the future. Additionally, the arbitral issue can become a
"rallying cause" for the union and can eventually lead to certain modifications to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
The notion that arbitration can have a therapeutic value has received little scholarly at-
tention. For a commentary on Justice Douglas' view about the therapeutic value of labor
arbitration, see Roger I. Abrams, Frances E. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Arbitral Therapy, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1751 (1994).
83. See Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1490-
93 (1959) (noting the political nature of collective bargaining).
84. Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-67 (1990).
85. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 1, at 2083-95 (collecting cases concern-
ing duty of fair representation damages); see also Jerald J. Director, Annotation, Union's
Liability in Damages for Refusal or Failure to Process Employee Grievance, 34 A.L.R. 3D 884 (2005)
(surveying cases involving union damages for breaching the duty of fair representation).
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tress.86 Even if the union ultimately prevails in the litigation, the
attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in defending duty of fair
representation claims can be substantial 7
Indeed, by way of example, in 1979 the Supreme Court upheld a
claim that a union was liable for $40,000 in compensatory damages
due to its failure to pursue a single grievance alleging wrongful dis-
charge.88 By contrast, in a 1993 class action, a union was held liable
for almost fourteen million dollars as its share of liability for a
breach of the duty of fair representation, although the case was
eventually remitted to the lower court which issued a one million
dollar damage award. 8 A 2003 case upheld $165,000 in damages
against a union for a breach of the duty of fair representation in-
volving the refusal to proceed with a discharge arbitration.90 In
2007, the Ninth Circuit upheld a total damage award of $191,304."'
In none of these cases was the possibility of re-arbitration consid-
ered as a remedy or as part of a remedy.9"
Under the current system, plaintiffs also have a choice of forum.
They can litigate in court or can file an administrative charge with
the NLRB, with or without an attorney.93 The fact that there are two
routes compounds the fear in the system because laymen may not
understand the difference between these two forums.
In plenary actions, few plaintiffs would be satisfied by merely fil-
ing a lawsuit seeking re-arbitration. If they are going to go through
the time, expense and trouble of litigation, they are going to shoot
for the stars and seek a large damage award. Of course, plaintiffs
will need to pay their lawyer, who may or may not have been re-
tained on a contingency fee basis.
86. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 2083-85 (collecting cases and not-
ing that courts are in conflict with respect to awarding damages for emotional distress).
87. Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L.
REV. 365, 432 (2004). Duty of fair representation hybrid claims are usually filed in federal
court and the parties have the same litigation costs as in any other federal lawsuit.
88. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
89. Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 58 E3d 513 (10th Cir. 1995).
90. LaPerriere v. UAW, 348 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 2003).
91. Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 878
(9th Cir. 2007). Beck also involved a violation of Title VII. Id. The damages were broken up
as including $125,000 in compensatory damages, $16,034 in lost wages and $50,000 in puni-
tive damages. Id. Punitive damages are not available in pure duty of fair representation
cases. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979).
92. There are, of course, many other examples. In 1998, a union was held responsible
for more than $22,000 as its share of responsibility due to the perfunctory processing of a
discharge arbitration. Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.9 (10th Cir.
1998). A union was found responsible for $26,000 in 1996 due to its failure to properly pre-
sent a grievance. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing duty of fair representa-
tion claims under the NLRA).
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The practice of most plaintiffs of simply filing actions for mone-
tary damages is understandable in that Vaca did not mandate that
re-arbitration be the only remedy. What was not predictable, how-
ever, was that the courts and the defendant union bar would
entirely overlook re-arbitration as a potential remedy. The Vaca de-
cision is now over forty years old and part of settled law.14 However,
due to the lack of consideration paid to re-arbitration as a remedy,
one must question how many litigators and jurists have actually
read the Vaca decision since law school.
As discussed in Part Five of this Article, re-arbitration should be
a presumptive remedy where a breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation is found due to the failure of a union to pursue a grievance.
However, it is first necessary to explain how and why duty of fair
representation complaints should and could be moved out of the
court system.
IV. THE ADJUDICATION OF DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
DISPUTES NEEDS TO BE MOVED FROM THE Ex-POST STAGE
(AFTER A COURT DISPUTE HAS ARISEN) TO THE EX-ANTE
STATE (BEFORE A COURT DISPUTE HAS ARISEN)
Duty of fair representation litigation often arises because indi-
vidual union members have no right to arbitrate grievances under
a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the em-
ployer.9 5 If a union refuses to arbitrate or advocate a certain
position that a bargaining unit member wants to advocate, hostility
can develop. Hostility, in turn, breeds litigation. Therefore, any
reform of duty of fair representation jurisprudence needs to rec-
ognize this inherent conflict.
Any proposal to modify duty of fair representation jurispru-
dence also needs to be realistic. Labor law issues are often highly
political and emotional. It is not always only about the money;
sometimes, one side or the other really wants to make a point.
Unfortunately, it is no secret to most labor law practitioners and
labor law scholars that American labor law is badly in need of re-
96form. However, there are not currently any serious legislative
94. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
95. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 374 (1990) ("The pertinent part of
the collective-bargaining agreement, Article IX, consists entirely of an agreement between
the union and the employer and enforceable only by them."); cf. Rubinstein, supra note 23,
at 52-56 (discussing various exceptions to this general principle of labor law).
96. Indeed, U.S. Senator Arlen Spector and Eric S. Nguyen recently published a law
review article where their first sentence recognized that "American labor law has failed to
make good on its promise to employees that they are free to embrace collective bargaining if
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proposals to modify duty of fair representation jurisprudence. 9 As
a result, an examination or re-examination of the case law is neces-
sary. Significantly, the duty of fair representation was judicially
created and therefore, it can be judicially modified and extended.
Like most litigation, duty of fair representation jurisprudence
has been driven by ex-post disputes. However, it can literally take
years for a court to decide a dispute. Time is of critical importance
in labor law. The employee may be out of a job and emotions run
high. At that point, the unfairly represented employee is likely to
seek all that he can in the form of monetary damages. As a result,
waiting for a court award is not necessarily in the best interest of
any party, the process, or public policy. If the dispute can be re-
solved quicker and in a less costly manner outside the formal court
system, all parties may be better off.
A. Union Internal Review Tribunals As a Defense
In Duty of Fair Representation Litigation
Current law requires that union members exhaust internal un-
ion procedures before they are permitted to bring a duty of fair
representation action in court. As explained below, such internal
they choose." Arlen Specter & Eric S. Nguyen, Representation Without Intimidation: Securing
Workers' Right to Choose Under the National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 311
(2008) (quoting Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. Rv. 1769,1770 (1983)).
Other scholars and I have recognized the need for labor law reform. Rubinstein, supra
note 21, at 263; see also Estreicher, Freedom of Contract, supra note 13, at 827 (noting that
"[o]ur labor laws are badly in need of reexaminiation and reform [and] .... reform of the
labor laws, however is not in the offing"); Estreicher, Win-Win Labor Law Reform, supra note
13 (discussing specific reforms that are needed to U.S. labor law); Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 (2002) (stating that "the
basic text [of the NLRA] has been practically unamendable for a half-century ... ").
97. As this Article goes to print, there appears to be some growing support for labor
law reform. In 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Employee Free Choice
Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007), but that bill was filibustered in the U.S. Senate. That bill
was recently re-introduced into Congress. H.R. 1409, lllth Cong. (2009); S. 560, lllth
Cong. (2009). As I have recently stated, the Employee Free Choice Act is likely to be enacted
into law as a result of the 2008 presidential and congressional elections. Additionally, the
current economic recession and financial crisis makes passage more likely due to the need
to increase the purchasing power of workers through higher wages. While the Employee
Free Choice Act would result in a significant amendment to the NLRA with respect to repre-
sentation elections, collective bargaining of first contract disputes and unfair labor practice
remedies, it would not affect duty of fair representation jurisprudence. See Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, Obama's Big Deal: The 2009 Federal Stimulus-Labor and Employment Law At the
Crossroads, 33 Rutgers L. Rec. I (forthcoming 2009) (discussing Employee Free Choice Act
in light of current economic and political climate). See also Wilma B. Liebman, Essay, Decline
and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 569,589 (2007).
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union procedures could constitute a complete defense to duty of
fair representation complaints, provided that the system adopted is
fair and regular. To be effective, this tribunal review system must
also have the authority to award a plaintiff full relief.
Many unions9s have employed various types of internal review
processes99 which provide disgruntled union members with an op-
portunity to challenge union decisions, such as the decision not to
file a grievance or demand arbitration. As a result, a significant
body of law related to internal union tribunals has developed.
The Supreme Court ruled that before an employee can bring an
action against an employer for an alleged breach of a collective
bargaining contract, he or she must first exhaust any grievance and
arbitration procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.'0° In Clayton v. UAW,'0 ' the Supreme Court extended this
exhaustion principle to duty of fair representation claims.'
0 2
In Clayton, after an employee was dismissed he asked his union
to file a grievance, which it initially did, but the union ultimately
refused to proceed to arbitration. Plaintiff was notified of this deci-
98. The UAW has had an internal procedure since 1957 which allows union members
to appeal grievances which the union has denied and additionally has successfully negoti-
ated into many collective bargaining agreements the ability to revive grievances where a
breach of duty is found. Malin, supra note 13, at 180 n.230; see e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S.
679, 682-83 (1981) (discussing UAW process); DeMott v. UAW, No. 07-12648, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 89649, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007) (same).
Other unions have developed similar processes. See, e.g., Maddalone v. Local 17, United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 152 F.3d 178, 186-87 (2d. Cir. 1998) (discussing the review process
utilized by the Carpenters union); Repstine v. Burlington N. Inc., 149 F.3d 1068, 1073 n.7
(10th Cir. 1998) (discussing review processes utilized by United Transportation Union); cf
Tinsley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.2d 778, 779-80 (7th Cir. 1981) (dismissing duty of
fair representation case due to failure to exhaust Teamster internal union appeal process).
99. Peer review and other types of internal review systems are, of course, not unique to
labor law. Corporations have been utilizing such systems for years. These internal steps "per-
form critical filtering functions" which gives the parties the opportunity to examine the case
and explore early settlement before litigation. David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael
Heise, Assessing The Case For Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN.
L. REv. 1557, 1565 (2005); see, e.g., Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2001);
Baldeo v. Darden Rests., Inc., 2005 WL 447033 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005); Quinney v. Gen.
Elec. Polymershapes, No. 304-CV-1058, 2004 WL 1782554 (N.D. Tex.July 30, 2004).
100. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). Interestingly, the re-
quirement that plaintiffs must exhaust internal review processes has been extended to the
non-union workplace where a plaintiff was subject to a grievance procedure contained in an
employee handbook. SeeNeiman v. Yale Univ., 851 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 2004).
101. 451 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1981); see also Clarke v. Commc'ns Workers, 318 E Supp. 2d
48, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting cases).
102. The exhaustion requirement has deep-seated roots in other areas of labor law not
involving the duty of fair representation. For example, under the Labor-Management Re-
porting Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006) ("LMRDA"), courts generally
require exhaustion of internal union remedies provided for in a local or international union
constitution prior to bringing suit. MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE
UNION 28-29 (1988) (collecting LMRDA case law).
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sion after the time for demanding arbitration had expired. The
United Auto Workers constitution mandated that members first
exhaust internal union appeal procedures before seeking redress
in court.10 3 Plaintiff Clayton did not timely file an internal appeal
from the local union's decision not to arbitrate. Instead, plaintiff
filed a hybrid action in federal court under Section 301 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, 0 4 alleging that the
employer breached the collective bargaining agreement by dis-
charging him without just cause and that the union violated its
duty of fair representation by arbitrarily refusing to arbitrate.
The Court approved of lower courts exercising their discretion
to require exhaustion where employees could get full relief. As the
Court stated:
In exercising this discretion, at least three factors should be
relevant: first, whether union officials are so hostile to the
employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on
his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals proce-
dures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's
grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301;
and third, whether exhaustion of internal procedures would
unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a
judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. If any of these fac-
tors are found to exist, the court may properly excuse the
employee's failure to exhaust.
Where internal union appeals procedures can result in either
complete relief to an aggrieved employee or reactivation of
his grievance, exhaustion would advance the national labor
policy of encouraging private resolution of contractual labor
disputes.'05
103. These internal procedures required that the member first seek relief from the
membership of his or her local and if the member was not satisfied, he or she could further
appeal to the International Executive Board, and finally, to either the Constitutional Con-
vention Appeals Committee or to a Public Review Board composed of "impartial persons of
good public repute" who were not members of the UAW. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 683.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
105. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689, 692. This test has been described by later courts as a bal-
ance between the "the right of union members to institute suit against the policy ofjudicial
noninterference in union affairs." Lazzaro v. UAW, No. 5:02-CV-01452, 2005 WL 1147797,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2005) (quotingJohnson v. Gen. Motors, 641 E2d 1075, 1079 (2d Cir.
1981).
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Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiff did not have to ex-
haust his administrative remedies by going through the UAW's
internal appeal process because the relief available under that
process was inadequate. Specifically, the UAW appeal process did
not include the authority to award reinstatement, which was one of
the remedies plaintiff was seeking."' 6
In a footnote, the Court also recognized that if the collective
bargaining agreement permitted an untimely grievance to go for-
ward, the plaintiff would have the duty to exhaust internal union
remedies.' °7 In another footnote, the Court recognized that if such
cases could go forward, a union might be able to rectify the very
wrong that the employee complained about-the failure to file a
grievance.' 8
The UAW later took advantage of the language in the Court's
footnotes. Shortly after Clayton was decided, the UAW was able to
correct the deficiencies with its internal review process. The union
secured agreements from a number of employers that permitted
the reactivation of otherwise time-barred grievances where the
UAW internal tribunal determined whether the union breached its
duty of fair representation.'0°
If the employer is unwilling to let an otherwise time-barred
grievance go forward, existing law permits an unfairly represented
employee to have his grievance or arbitration processed if the
plaintiff has established a breach of the duty of fair representation,
irrespective of the time limits set forth in the collective bargaining
106. This decision would not be remarkable except for the fact that the UAW's appeal
process also included the ability to award back pay. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 690. If this case were
brought today with a plaintiff only seeking monetary damages, the result may have been
different because the union's internal tribunal would have the authority to award the full
relief requested. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing how most plain-
tiffs today only seek money damages as a remedy for a breach of the duty of fair
representation).
107. As the Court stated:
If a provision in the collective-bargaining agreement also permits reactivation of a
grievance after an internal union appeal, an employer or union should also be able
to rely on that provision and thus defend the § 301 suit on the ground that the em-
ployee failed to exhaust internal union procedures.
Clayton, 451 U.S. at 692 n.20.
108. Id. at 693 n.21.
109. ST. ANTOINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 846; see, e.g., Monroe v. UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24
(6th Cir. 1983). Union review of internal decisions not to arbitrate relate to internal union
affairs, and as such, are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1383-85 (internal union affairs are permissive subjects of bar-
gaining). Therefore, an employer cannot compel a union to adopt an internal tribunal
review process. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, at 511-46 (distinguishing between manda-
tory, permissive and illegal subjects of collective bargaining).
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agreement." ° In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.," the Court held
that a union's breach of its duty of fair representation removed the
finality from any prior arbitration award. As the Court reasoned:
[I] t is urged that when the procedures have been followed
and a decision favorable to the employer announced, the em-
ployer must be protected from relitigation by the express
contractual provision declaring a decision to be final and
binding. We disagree. The union's breach of duty relieves the
employee of an express or implied requirement that disputes
be settled through contractual grievance procedures; if it se-
riously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process the
union's breach also removes the bar of the finality provisions
of the contract.
1 2
Later in the opinion, the Court also stated that it made no differ-
ence at which point of the grievance procedure the union
breached its duty of fair representation.'
3
Thus, Clayton and Hines, read together, reasonably stand for the
propositions that: 1) an aggrieved union member must exhaust any
internal review processes employed by the union if complete relief
could be obtained; and 2) if a court finds a breach of the duty of
fair representation, time limits contained in the collective bargain-
ing agreement may be set aside. In that way, a case could be
arbitrated notwithstanding the nominal contractual time limits
contained in the collective bargaining agreement.
If this result could be compelled where internal union review tri-
bunals are utilized, it would move the resolution of duty of fair
representation disputes from the ex-post stage (after a court dis-
pute has arisen) to the ex-ante stage (before a court dispute has
arisen) and further public policy aims by removing such disputes
from the court system. Removing these claims from the courts
would also relieve tension between employees and their union as
110. See, e.g., Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976) (discussing remedies for
breach of the duty of fair representation in the context of a time-barred grievance)).
111. 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976).
112. Id.
113. As the Court stated:
To us it makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration process by
refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trail to the end, but in so do-
ing subverts the arbitration process by failing to fairly represent the employee. In
neither case, does the employee receive fair representation.
Id. at 572 (quoting Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974)).
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union members would have an opportunity to be heard without
having to file a lawsuit.
However, there are at least four significant and inter-related is-
sues that accompany mandating the use of internal union review
tribunals. First, significant issues may arise concerning the appro-
priate standards that these internal union tribunals must follow.
Second, legal issues may arise because unlike existing jurispru-
dence, there would be no adjudication by a court. Third, there
may be timing problems as the statute of limitations to file a griev-
ance may expire before the internal union review process is
complete. Finally, employers may find permitting union officials to
apportion damages problematic.
1. Union Internal Review Tribunal Standards
Undoubtedly, having union tribunals determine whether the un-
ion has breached its duty of fair representation is somewhat
awkward. Nevertheless, existing duty of fair representation juris-
prudence provides support for this concept and is instructive for
determining how internal union tribunals should be constituted.
For example, if the union member were able to show extreme hos-
tility at the local and international level, exhaustion of the union's
internal appeal process would not be required. 1 4 Additionally, the
standards outlined in Clayton provide useful criteria to determine
whether or not the union tribunal internal review system is valid.
1 5
Thus, if the internal union tribunal system is a sham or proce-
durally irregular, a duty of fair representation lawsuit would be
permitted to proceed in court.
The concept of allowing unions to establish internal review tri-
bunals has precedence in labor law beyond just the NLRA. Under
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
("LMRDA")," 6 union members are entitled to a trial before an in-
114. See, e.g., LaPerriere v. UAW, 348 F.3d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding $165,000
damage action against union for failing to grieve discharge and rejecting defense that plain-
tiff failed to exhaust his internal union remedies because plaintiff established hostility on
the part of his local union as well as the international union). Hostility at the local union
level does not excuse the failure to exhaust if a further appeal can be heard at the interna-
tional union level. Id.; see also Lazzaro v. UAW, No. 5:02-CV-01452, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9065, at *10 (N.D.N.Y May 16, 2005) (same); Austin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 94-CV-832A(H),
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20990, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 1995) (same); cf. DeMott v. UAW,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89649, at *11 (E.D.M.I. Dec 6, 2007) ("Plaintiffs are required to dem-
onstrate hostility or bias at every level of a union's appeal process.").
115. See supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text (discussing Clayton).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006).
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ternal union trial board if they contest the imposition of internal
union discipline, such as a fine for crossing a picket line.
Some of the lessons learned from those hearing tribunals can be
applied to union internal duty of fair representation tribunals. The
LMRDA requires that employees have the opportunity to be heard.
LMRDA decisions from the internal union tribunal do not have to
be made by an independent outside decision maker."' While the
trial board which hears and decides such cases cannot be biased,
the tribunal does not have to be entirely composed of neutrals-in
the classic sense of an outside arbitrator, or professor who acts as a
quasi-judge. The decision-makers must merely be neutral in the
sense that they are not involved in the dispute. Decision-makers
may, however, be union officials." 8
Of course, it might be in the union's interest to retain profes-
sional neutrals such as arbitrators or professors who review these
types of cases to avoid any claim of collusion. Additionally, review
by a professional neutral may help insulate the union against
claims of discrimination or other types of litigation it may face. Use
of a neutral may also facilitate employer cooperation. This is be-
cause employers are more likely to have confidence in a system
where neutrals make determinations that can affect them. Whether
the union decides to retain such a neutral is simply an internal
business decision.
As maintained by this Article, both the use of a valid internal un-
ion tribunal or the failure of a union member to utilize such a
review system should constitute a complete defense to duty of fair
representation claims. The review system adopted by the union,
however, must be legitimate. 19 At a minimum, the Union should
117. Maddalone v. Local 17, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 152 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir.
1998) (appeal to General President of carpenters' union); Arnold v. United Mine Workers,
293 E3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 2002) (appeal to internal union executive board with a further
appeal to union convention committee). But see Monroe v. UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1983) (internal review process includes possible appeal to independent academic and
social agency personnel who have no UAW affiliation).
118. See Cornelio v. Metro. Dist. Council, 243 F. Supp. 126, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1965), afj'd per
curiam, 358 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1966) (describing legislative scheme for the protection of indi-
vidual union members of labor unions under the LMRDA as "a 'within the family'
procedure for resolving intra-union conflicts"); J. Ralph Beaird & Mack A. Player, Union
Discipline of Its Membership Under Section 101(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin: What is "Discipline" and
How Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REV. 383, 411 (1975) (noting that statute will not tolerate
"kangaroo courts," but absolute neutrality by an outside third party is not required); MALIN,
supra note 102, at 104-05 (discussing procedural rights under LMRDA); HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 1083-89 (same); see generally Curtis v. Theatrical Stage Employees, 687 E2d
1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding impartial hearing held by union officer with no legal
training).
119. Where a union subverts an arbitration to such an extent that the process is a sham,
it will be found to have breached its duty of fair representation. Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp.,
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have the obligation to inform the member about the internal tri-
bunal review process so that he or she has the opportunity to
utilize it.'20 Union members should also have the right to appear
with counsel or with another employee. This will contribute to the
legitimacy of the tribunal and provide the employee with an op-
portunity to be heard while expressing his or her arguments in an
organized and professional manner. Preferably, two levels of inter-
nal appeal could be instituted as in Clayton.
Of course, as under existing law, an employee would retain the
right to appeal from the decision of the union internal tribunal.
However, the scope of judicial review would be very narrow. A
court would only examine whether or not the tribunal followed its
own rules and procedures and provided a fair and regular process.
Otherwise, if a more searching review were provided, court's would
become entangled in something akin to an arbitral dispute be-
cause the court would be put in the position of reviewing the
merits of the dispute in question.
2. The Problems Caused Because There Will Be
No Court Adjudication of Liability
Significantly, in both Clayton and Hines there was a court deter-
mination of liability. If union internal review tribunals are to be
mandated, as argued in this Article, there would be no judicial de-
termination. Clayton and Hines would have to be extended to
provide a complete defense to the duty of fair representation if the
tribunal, as opposed to a court, decides whether the union
breached its duty of fair representation.
This issue has not been be litigated. However, in labor law, it is
appropriate to look to other similar statutes for guidance.2
501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974); Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278, 1282
(11th Cir. 2006). The same standard should apply to any internal review system that a union
may adopt.
120. Remarkably, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
29 U.S.C. § 401, many courts have held that unions do not have an affirmative duty to in-
form members of internal union appeal processes reasoning that it is the employee's
affirmative duty to inquire about such processes and ignorance of the law, so to speak, is no
defense. Hammer v. UAW, 178 E3d 856,858 (7th Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 179
F. Supp. 2d 714, 723 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (same); LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION, supra
note 1, at 336 (collecting authorities holding same).
The better reasoned view, however, is that unions must inform employees of the process,
if the union is going to rely on this process as an affirmative defense to any fair representa-
tion claim. See, e.g., Maddalone, 152 F.3d at 186.
121. As I have previously recognized, courts adjudicating labor and employment claims
under various labor and employment statutes often look to other employment cases for
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Fortunately, present day employment discrimination jurisprudence
supports the extension of Clayton and Hines in a manner which
provides such tribunals with the authority to determine whether a
breach of the duty of fair representation occurred.
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,122 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,1 23 the Court held that an employer may have an affirmative
defense to a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment 124 by
one of its supervisors if the employer had in place a reasonable sys-
tem where the aggrieved employee could complain and seek
relief. 125 Thus, the Supreme Court has approved of internal griev-
ance type systems as a defense to liability in certain employment
cases without a judicial determination of liability. In so doing, the
Court recognized that employers may be able to remedy certain
complaints of sexual harassment without court intervention. Of
course, no unions were involved in either of those Title VII cases.
However, it is submitted that the lack of union presence in those
guidance. Rubinstein, supra note 81, at 437; Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge
Misconduct Discovered After an Employees' Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990) (stating that National Labor Relations Act is grandfather of
most labor laws).
122. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
123. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). Ellerth was decided by the Supreme Court the same day as
Faragher. In Ellerth, the Court adopted the same standard of employer vicarious liability as in
Faragher. 524 U.S. at 765.
124. Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in the American workforce and is, of
course, unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2006). See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (discussing nature of
sexual harassment).
125. Specifically, the Supreme Court explained an employer's responsibility for sexual
harassment as follows:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a de-
fending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective op-
portunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that
an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is
not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable
to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when
litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to
fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to
showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the em-
ployer's burden under the second element of the defense.
Elerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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cases is irrelevant and therefore, this would not be a basis to distin-
guish those cases.
Ellerth and Faragher together with Clayton and Hines support the
proposition that union internal review tribunals should be able to
make a binding determination with respect to whether a breach of
the duty of fair representation occurred notwithstanding the lack
of court review. Certainly, no provision of law prevents authorizing
union internal review tribunals with the authority to make such
determinations. If union internal review tribunals are given this
authority, resort to that process could be compelled and this proc-
ess would constitute a complete defense to any duty of fair
representation claim filed later in court by an employee who failed
to exhaust this remedy.
3. The Statute of Limitations Problem
Even if a court judgment of liability is not necessary, the use of
internal union review tribunals may present statute of limitations
issues with respect to the processing of what would otherwise likely
be an untimely grievance. By the time the internal union tribunal
would have made its decision, the time frame to file a grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement would likely have ex-
pired. 26 Without cooperation from the employer, an untimely
grievance will be barred. Therefore, this Article also proposes that
union internal review tribunals be given the authority to set aside
the time limits of the collective bargaining agreement when they
find that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
While existing law does not require that the collective bargaining
grievance time limits be set aside, it is submitted that nothing in
existing law prohibits this proposal from being adopted. This ap-
proach is simply an extension of Clayton and Hines and must
necessarily be super-imposed in order to afford union members
complete relief. From a policy perspective, it appears to be an un-
fair burden to require that union members litigate claims in court
simply because an arbitrary grievance and arbitration timetable was
negotiated. After all, collective bargaining agreements are not stat-
utes. They are contracts, to which the individual employee is not
even a party.
Authorizing these internal union tribunals to set aside statutes of
limitations that may be nominally included in a collective bargain-
126. A typical collective bargaining agreement contains a 30 day period to file a griev-
ance. I refer to this period as a statute of limitation.
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ing agreement is entirely consistent with the notion that these tri-
bunals be given the authority to decide the dispute in the first
instance. Indeed, the authority to set aside arbitral time limits must
go hand and hand with mandating an extension of Clayton and
Hines to require duty of fair representation plaintiffs to utilize un-
ion internal review tribunals. 21 Unions and employers may
voluntarily choose to include language in their collective bargain-
ing agreements permitting such nominally untimely grievances to
go forward, and thereby make litigation less likely. 28 Absent
agreement, Hines would have to be extended to grant internal un-
ion tribunals the power to ignore collective bargaining agreement
statute of limitations where a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion is found. This is similar to removing the finality from an
arbitration decision due to a duty of fair representation breach as
was done in Hines.
4.The Problem With Apportionment of Damages
As noted, plaintiffs routinely seek monetary damages in duty of
fair representation cases. 2 9 Therefore, to be successful, internal
review tribunals should have the authority to award plaintiffs
monetary relief. Though uncommon, some union tribunals already
have this authority. 30 Existing law only requires court apportion-
ment of damages after a court determines that a union has
breached its duty of fair representation. Again, having the union
decide such issues may appear awkward to some. Significantly,
however, nothing in existing law prevents unions from granting
internal tribunals the authority to apportion liability according to
the degree of fault just as a court would. 3' Again, courts could sim-
ply extend existing jurisprudence to validate this authority. The
Faragher/Ellerth line of cases, which authorizes employers to remedy
sexual harassment complaints without court intervention, supports
127. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text (discussing extending existing law
to mandate the use of union internal review tribunals).
128. The UAW as well as other unions have successfully negotiated such agreements
with several different employers. See supra note 98.
129. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
130. Support for this concept can be found in Hammer v. UAW 178 F3d 856, 856 (7th
Cir. 1999), where a disgruntled union member's duty of fair representation claim was dis-
missed due to the plaintiffs failure to exhaust internal union remedies. His fair
representation claim sought money damages which the union internal review process had
the authority to award.
131. When a breach of the duty of fair representation is found, damages are appor-
tioned between the employer and the union according to the degree of fault. Bowen v.
United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1983).
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the argument that a judicially found breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation is not necessary.
The system would work more smoothly if employers and unions
could agree to be bound by such decisions. However, obtaining the
employers' consent to be bound by the decision of a union inter-
nal tribunal may be difficult. Employers may fear that unions
would place excessive liability on them. However, it is in the un-
ion's interest to administer these tribunals fairly. The goal would
be to obtain employer cooperation. Nonetheless, it is recognized
that some employers may refuse to cooperate if these tribunals
have the authority to award monetary damages.
At the very least, suspicious employers should give this proposal
a chance to work. The upside potential is the virtual elimination of
duty of fair representation litigation. The downside, of course, is
that unions may impose an unfair degree of blame on the em-
ployer. The internal union tribunal decision would still be binding
if it fully compensates the plaintiff. There is, however, a practical
solution to this problem. If re-arbitration becomes a presumptive
remedy as is argued next, then the issue of the award of monetary
damages is no longer so problematic. With re-arbitration, neither
the employer nor the union face the specter of a monetary damage
award from the union internal review tribunal.
V. RE-ARBITRATION AS A PRESUMPTIVE REMEDY
Not all unions are going to adopt internal review tribunals.
Thus, a class of duty of fair representation cases may remain before
the courts to adjudicate in the first instance. In those cases, and
even if none of the proposals outlined in Part Four are adopted, re-
arbitration should be the presumptive remedy where a breach of
the duty of fair representation is found due to a union's failure to
arbitrate.
In Vaca, the Supreme Court held that "[t] he appropriate remedy
for a breach of a union's duty of fair representation must vary with
the circumstances of the particular breach" and that "an order
compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the available
remedies when a breach of duty is proved.',3 2 Professor Martin H.
Malin, a well known labor law scholar, has described this part of
duty of fair representation jurisprudence as "Vaca's forgotten alter-
132. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195-96 (1967).
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native.",3 3 Nevertheless, re-arbitration remains a viable remedy
which courts should adopt.
134
The practice of courts in simply awarding monetary damages
when a breach of the duty of fair representation is found does not
comport with labor law principles which have followed a "hands
off' approach to the decisions of labor arbitrators who are charged
with the responsibility to determine whether a collective bargain-
ing agreement has been violated and issuing an appropriate
remedy in the form of an arbitration award.' 35 The whole idea of
labor arbitration is that courts should stay out of labor disputes and
that disputes under collective bargaining agreements are to be re-
solved by arbitrators who, as described by Professor Theodore St.
Antoine in his classic work more than three decades ago, function
as readers of collective bargaining agreements for the parties.
Arbitration has a rich history in this county as being considered
133. Malin, supra note 13, at 182.
134. But see LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 1, at 396 (describing
remand to arbitration as a "theoretical remedy" because courts have only rarely directed
re-arbitration).
135. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a presumption in favor of arbi-
trability, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986); Litton Financial Printing Div.
v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991), that courts employ an extremely narrow scope of judicial
review and that reviewing courts may not weigh the merits of any particular dispute. United
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In one of the Court's more recent decisions on labor arbi-
tration, the Court went so far as to state that "[w] hen an arbitrator resolves disputes ... and
no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly, factfinding,' does not pro-
vide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award." Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
The Supreme Court has also held that a labor arbitration award can be vacated if it vio-
lates public policy. The award must, however, contravene "some explicit public policy" that is
"well defined and dominant" which is to be ascertained by reference to laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of the public interest. United Paperworkers
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
136. Professor Theodore St. Antoine is perhaps best known for arguing that labor arbi-
trators are the designated reader of the collective bargaining agreement and his or her
reading of the collective bargaining agreement is considered to be the same as the parties
reading of the contract. TheodoreJ. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1977); Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look At Enterprise Wheel And
Its Progeny in Arbitration, 30 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 29 (1977); see also David E. Feller, Reme-
dies in Arbitration: Old Problems Revisited, 34 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 109, 110 (1981)
(concurring with Professor St. Antoine's belief that a labor arbitrator functions as the parties
"contract reader").
Professor St. Antoine views have been judicially accepted. See Stead Motors v. Auto Ma-
chinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 E2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (quoting extensively from
St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, supra); Haw. Teamsters Local 996 v.
United Parcel Serv., 241 E3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting same). See also Cole v. Bums Int'l
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Edwards, J.) (stating that St. Antoine arti-
cle is widely recognized as almost a gospel statement).
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part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.137 Yet, if
an unfairly represented employee is permitted to side-step arbitra-
tion and receive monetary damages, the collective bargaining
grievance and arbitration process is not being fully respected.
As Senior D.C. Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards, a former accom-
plished labor arbitrator and full time law professor, has stated with
regard to duty of fair representation jurisprudence:
[I] t seems that the courts have ignored the federal labor pol-
icy of nonintervention in the arbitral process and have
proceeded wholesale to decide the merits of the underlying
grievances rather than returning the cases to arbitration. I am
of the view that this practice not only alters the parties' bar-
gain but threatens havoc with labor contract administration.
138
Judge Edwards asserts that the remedy for a violation of em-
ployer and employee collectively bargained rules must be provided
by the collective agreement itself, not notions of public law or pol-
icy that courts administer because those principles are external to
the collective bargaining process. Judge Edwards maintains that it
is the function of the labor arbitrator and not a judge to say what a
labor contract means.
139
Professor Martin H. Malin's views are largely in accord with
those of Judge Edwards. 40 The failure of courts to recognize re-
arbitration as a remedy has the potential to undermine labor policy
because courts are being placed in the position of having to inter-
pret a collective bargaining agreement. As Professor Malin states:
Today, if a court finds a DFR breach, the underlying breach
of contract claim will be heard by a jury if the plaintiff de-
manded a jury trial, and there will be a judicial
apportionment of back pay damages between employer and
union. The employer, no matter how blameless, cannot rely
on the grievance procedure to avoid judicial determination of
the grievance, even if the employer already has succeeded in
arbitration.
137. St. Antoine, supra note 136; accord Malin, supra note 13 at 174 (stating that
"[a] rbitration, however, is a continuation of the collective bargaining process.").
138. Edwards, supra note 13, at 101.
139. Id. at 102.
140. See generally Malin, supra note 13.
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The typical DFR case arising out of a union's handling of a
discharge grievance illustrates the potential for undermining
labor policy regarding grievance arbitration. When an em-
ployer agrees that it will only discharge for just cause, it does
so recognizing that just cause in any particular case will ulti-
mately be defined by an arbitrator. The parties have agreed
that just cause means whatever the arbitrator interprets it to
mean .... When because of a DFR breach, a judge or a jury
defines just cause, the parties are held to a bargain markedly
different from the one to which they originally agreed. Courts
should be reluctant to change the basis of the parties' bar-
gain. Under the current state of the law, limiting the DFR's
level of accountability also limits judicial rewriting of the par-
ties' bargain. 4'
Judge Edwards and Professor Malin are not alone. A decade and
a half ago, another well-known labor scholar, Professor Samuel
Estreicher, argued that duty of fair representation jurisprudence
should be changed to trigger re-arbitration as a remedy.142 Profes-
sor Estreicher additionally recognized that there are limitations
with respect to the use of re-arbitration as a remedy. With respect
to any interim period where there is a hiatus because of the un-
ion's breach of duty, according to Estreicher, the union should be
responsible for back pay.
It is submitted that most unions and employers would probably
accept such a result. This is because if the matter was litigated,
damages would be apportioned under Bowen v. United States Postal
Service 43 and the union would undoubtedly be responsible for any
additional damages caused by the hiatus.'"
Re-arbitration as a remedy has not gone completely unnoticed.
In fact, support for the use of re-arbitration as a remedy in duty of
141. Id.
142. Estreicher, Win-Win Labor Law Reform, supra note 13, at 675.
143. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
144. At one time, another very well known labor law scholar, the late Professor David
Feller, went so far as to argue that the only remedy in hybrid Section 301 duty of fair repre-
sentation actions should be re-arbitration. Professor Feller argued that this was necessary to
keep courts out of the business of interpreting labor agreements. David Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 774 (1973). Professor David
Feller later acknowledged that his view was not likely to ultimately prevail. David E. Feller,
The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 97, 102, 107-08
(1976); see also Lea S. VanderVelde, Making Good on Vaca s Promise: Apportioning Back Pay to
Achieve Remedial Goals, 32 UCLA L. REv. 302, 341 (1984) (discussing Professor Feller's views).
This Article does not go so far as the late Professor Feller and only asserts that re-
arbitration should be the presumptive remedy in duty of fair representation cases where a
breach is found due to the union's failure to arbitrate.
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fair representation cases can be found under Pennsylvania state
labor law applicable to public sector employees and employers,
45
which provides that re-arbitration is generally the only remedy
available to an unfairly represented employee. 46 Specifically, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that Vaca permitted
courts in the private sector to order re-arbitration, and reasoned
that this is the only remedy available to an unfairly represented
employee in the public sector out of a concern with making sure
that an unfairly represented employee be given the same treatment
as a fairly represented employee. Fairly represented employees, of
course, only have the opportunity to have their claim adjudicated
before labor arbitrators. 47 Thus, Pennsylvania incorporates some of
the concerns with existing duty of fair representation jurispru-
dence that had been raised earlier by Professors Malin, Estreicher
and Judge Edwards.
48
145. Penn. Public Employe [sic] Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. 1101 (1991).
Courts in the private sector have looked to public-sector employment cases for guidance.
See generally Rubinstein, supra note 81, at 437. However, it is recognized that most of the time
it is courts in the public sector which are looking to private sector cases for guidance. In
most jurisdictions, in the public sector, the duty of fair representation is virtually identical to
the private sector. See e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 673 (discussing duty of fair represen-
tation under New York public sector labor law). Therefore, it is appropriate for courts in the
private sector to look to state public sector duty of fair representation law for guidance.
146. Dubose v. Dist. 1199C, 105 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law); Martino v. Transp. Workers' Union Local 234, 480 A.2d 242, 243-44 (Pa. 1984);
John Kimpflen, Remedy of Order to Compel Arbitration; Damages, 20 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D EMPLOY-
MENT & LABOR RELATIONS § 9:115 (collecting authorities). Under Pennsylvania law, there is
an exception to this general rule which allows an employee to file an action for damages if
he can establish that the employer actively participated in the union's bad faith or otherwise
conspired with the union to deny the employee rights under the collective bargaining
agreement. Dubose, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 416; Kimpflen, supra.
147. As the Court stated:
Our holding that the chancellor lacks authority to resolve the underlying grievance is
consistent with ... the strong policy favoring arbitration of public sector griev-
ances.... Moreover, our holding that the Chancellor may, if the employee establishes
the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, order arbitration of the underly-
ing grievance nunc po tunc provides the employee with a complete and adequate
legal remedy....
Under this procedure, a wrongfully discharged employee receives precisely the
treatment all the employees in the unit are entitled to under the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
Martino v. Transp. Workers' Union Local 234, 480 A.2d 242, 251-52 (Pa. 1984).
148. See supra notes 138-144 and accompanying text. Indeed, this statute has been in-
terpreted by courts in a manner which is consistent with the late Professor David Feller's
original view that re-arbitration was the only appropriate remedy where a union refuses to
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Re-arbitration as a remedy is also supported by existing empiri-
cal data which indicates that it does not make much difference
whether employees have their cases heard by courts or by arbitra-
tors. The empirical research indicates that plaintiffs do not fare
significantly better in arbitration as opposed to litigation. However,
it should be noted that the data does not indicate whether the
damage amounts are fairer under one system or the other.49
Re-arbitration, though a rare bird in modern-day private-sector
duty of fair representation jurisprudence, has been ordered as a
remedy.50 In Stanton v. Delta Airlines,5 1 for example, the First Circuit
ordered re-arbitration in an opinion written by then First Circuit
Chief Judge Stephen Breyer. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that
the lower court erred by ordering re-arbitration because the court
should have decided the issue in the first instance. Judge Breyer,
writing for a unanimous First Circuit panel, rejected this argument
and cited Vaca for the proposition that an order compelling arbitra-
tion is one of the available remedies courts may order.1 52 The First
Circuit held that arbitration was an appropriate remedy because
"[t] he courts have consistently favored grievance arbitration as a de-
centralized, informal method of settling industrial disputes.' '5 ' As
Judge Breyer recognized, "[j]ustice requires a fair tribunal, but not
necessarily an 'optimal' one.' 54
Indeed, Judge Breyer rejected the argument that where a breach
of duty of fair representation was found, re-arbitration should not
be ordered because the union panel members might be hostile
toward the union member by virtue of the fact that the individual
arbitrate in breach of its duty of fair representation. See supra note 144 (discussing the late
Professor Feller's scholarship).
149. See Samuel Estreicher & Kristina Yost, Measuring the Value of Class and Collective Ac-
tion Employment Settlements: A Preliminary Assessment (N.Y.U. Law Sch., Pub. Law Res. Paper No.
08-03, 2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1080567 (citing Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury ', 11 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'YJ. 405 (2007)); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44;
Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 29 (1998); Sherwyn, et al., supra note 99, at 1564).
One fact is fairly clear from the data-arbitration is faster. Sherwyn, supra note 99, at 1578.
150. See Miner v. Local 373, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 513 F.3d 854, 864 (8th Cir. 2008);
Stanton v. Delta Airlines, 669 E2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1982); Williams v. Teamsters Local Un-
ion 484, 625 F.2d 138, 139 (6th Cir. 1980); see also Abrams v. Commc'ns Workers, No. 99-
7095, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7106 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2000); UAW v. NLRB, 168 F.3d 509, 515
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that court may order arbitration as a remedy if a breach of duty of
fair representation is found).
151. 669 F.2d 833, 836-37 (lst Cir. 1982).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 838.
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prevailed in suit against the union. 55 Significantly, Judge Breyer
went so far as to hold that there was a presumption in favor of re-
arbitration as a remedy, by stating: "the burden here rests on those
opposed to arbitration as a remedy to demonstrate why it is unsuit-
able. ,, 1' 6
Stanton has not been widely cited. It remains largely forgotten
just as the portion of Vaca which states that re-arbitration should be
one of the available remedies remains largely, but not completely,
overlooked. However, Vaca and Stanton remain good law, and the
principal that they stand for is occasionally recognized. 57 Judge
Breyer's decision should become the norm in duty of fair represen-
tation cases today.
The presumption recognized by Judge Breyer makes sense.
Re-arbitration simply places the injured employee in the same posi-
tion he or she would have been had there been no breach of the
duty of fair representation. This presumption should be rebut-
table. As the Supreme Court in Vaca stated, "[t]he appropriate
remedy for a breach of a union's duty of fair representation must
vary with the circumstances of the particular breach."'58
Exceptions to re-arbitration as a remedy should be rare. One
such exception might be where reinstatement of the employee
through arbitration would poison the workplace to such a point
that the employee could not interact or properly perform his job.
An analogy could be drawn to employment discrimination cases
where courts order "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement as a remedy
where reinstatement is not practically possible. 55
155. Id. at 837-39.
156. Stanton, 559 E2d at 836-37. This case arose under the Railway Labor Act. Under
the Railway Labor Act, certain minor disputes are heard by a system board of adjustment
which is an arbitration panel with both union and employer panel representatives. Steward
v. Mann, 351 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1989); Pyles v. United Air Lines, Inc., 79 F.3d 1046, 1050
(11th Cir. 1996).
157. For example, in 1980 the Sixth Circuit ordered re-arbitration as a remedy where a
breach of the duty of fair representation was found. Williams v. Teamsters Local Union 484,
625 F.2d 138, 138 (6th Cir. 1980). In 2008, the Eighth Circuit also stated that a proper rem-
edy for a breach of the duty of fair representation would be arbitration (the parties had not
arbitrated the dispute in the first instance), if after remand a valid collective bargaining
agreement was found to exist. Miner, 513 F.3d at 864.
158. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,195 (1967).
159. In employment discrimination, reinstatement is the preferred remedy. However,
where reinstatement is impossible or impracticable courts have awarded front pay for lost
future remuneration. Merrick T. Rossein, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGA-
TION § 22:46 (2008) (extensively discussing front pay in lieu of damages). As Professor
Merrick T. Rossein has explained:
The most common reason for the award of front pay is that there is no current vacancy in
the position at issue. Another common reason for not ordering reinstatement is dem-
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If, as recognized by Judge Breyer and advocated here, courts
conclude that re-arbitration is the presumptive remedy where a
breach of the duty of fair representation is found, courts would be
going a bit beyond the language in Vaca, which only held that re-
arbitration should be one of the available remedies. However, in
the forty-two plus years since Vaca was decided, arbitration has be-
come a common staple of labor law jurisprudence. Today,
arbitration is widely used even outside of labor-management rela-
tions and is an accepted form of alternative dispute resolution. °
Finally, if re-arbitration were adopted as a remedy, employees
would not be giving up much, as plaintiffs do not generally fare
well in duty of fair representation litigation. Such a system would
serve employer and union interests as well as the public interest by
decreasing unnecessary litigation. This system would be consistent
with our national labor policy which favors private, non-judicial




The duty of fair representation is an important check on the
power of unions. By being the exclusive representative of employ-
ees, unions have the power to control which grievances go to
arbitration and even which grievance are filed. Under our system
of labor law, individual employees and employers cannot bypass
the union in order to reach some type of private arrangement
which may be satisfactory. Like any grant of power, however, it
can be abused.
Unfortunately, however, present day duty of fair representation
jurisprudence simply does not work. The bar is set very high for
onstrated, long-standing hostility between the employee and his or her former superi-
ors... The higher the position at issue in the corporate hierarchy increases the
chances for front pay, especially if the duties entail trust, confidence and sensitive
managerial decisions.
Id.; see also Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw
AND PRACTICE § 4.25 at 337 (2d ed. 2004) (further discussing front pay and noting that it is
a discretionary remedy).
160. See Ariana R. Levinson, Lauryering Skills, Principles and Methods Offer Insight as to Best
Practices for Arbitration, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 7 (2008) (stating that there has been an explo-
sive use of arbitration in this country).
161. MALIN, supra note 102, at 442.
162. See Malin, supra note 13 (discussing principle of exclusivity and duty of fair repre-
sentation jurisprudence as a process of holding the union accountable for the exercise of
that grant of exclusive power). Indeed, under our current system of labor law, unions cannot
even assign their right to arbitrate to individual union members. See Rubinstein, supra note
23, at 44-45.
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liability. Such a high bar can leave individuals vulnerable to the
exercise of virtually unchecked union power.163 Nevertheless, the
current system often instills fear in unions which causes them to
file grievances which lack merit. Employers who are routinely
named as parties in duty of fair representation lawsuits are re-
quired to respond to such claims, which often causes them to incur
legal expenses and potential liability. As a result, current law does
not serve the interests of employees, employers or unions.
This Article's two basic proposals-namely that a union internal
tribunal review process is the only process that union members are
due and where a breach of duty is found, re-arbitration should be
the presumptive remedy-are workable concepts that can be
adopted by courts. These proposals also comport with notions of
justice by allowing affected employees with "an opportunity to be
heard," albeit outside the courtroom, where most labor disputes
belong. This should also cut down the hostility between disgrun-
tled union members and their union who may not see eye-to-eye
with respect to the collective bargaining agreement. If the internal
tribunal review process is a sham, the employee can still turn to the
court system for review.
If the proposals contained in this Article are adopted, resulting
in a virtual elimination of duty of fair representation litigation, in-
dividual union members would retain whatever statutory and other
rights they may have. Therefore, these proposals do not alter the
entire employment law landscape.
64
163. Harper & Lupu, supra note 13, at 1216.
164. With the decline of unionization in the United States, see Liebman, supra note 97,
at 570 n.2 (stating that organized labor as a percentage of the workforce in the private sec-
tor is at an historic low), individual employment rights have come into their own being with
the passage of such recent statutes in the last twenty plus years as the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006), Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi-
cation Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2006), Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12101 (2006), and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). Dur-
ing this period of time, the various states have also enacted important employment laws. See
Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Indivtidual Employment Rights:
Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REv. 687 (1997). As Professor Bales has
recognized:
The American model of workplace governance has shifted from a paradigm centered
on collective bargaining to one centered on individual employment rights. Though
the paradigms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the trend toward individual
rights clearly has come at the expense of collective bargaining.
Id. at 759.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the transformation from a collective to
individual statutory right regime recognized by Professor Bales, is undergoing another
change; an emphasis on contractual rights through alternative dispute resolution processes.
See Hodges, supra note 87, at 375.
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Although labor law issues are highly political, these proposals
are all realistic and fit into existing case law without the need for
any additional legislation. If courts approve of these modest pro-
posals, unions would be less fearful of duty of fair representation
lawsuits and, in turn, they would resist filing meritless grievances.
This would serve the public interest by cutting down on court con-
gestion while providing the injured employee with a real and
effective remedy. Employers would also not have to defend these
suits in court.
165. Liebman, supra note 97 at 580-83 (comparing and contrasting decisions by NLRB
appointed by Democrat President Clinton and Republican President Bush).
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